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ABSTRACT 
This article investigates whether the credit rating of bond issues in the Brazilian market is 
influenced by the differences between book income and taxable income (BTD), as well earning 
management practices, based on a sample of all nonfinancial firms that issued bonds in the 
period from 2004 to 2014 with published financial information, resulting in a final sample of 
96 observations. The results indicate BTD does not determine the credit rating in the Brazilian 
market. Additionally, we tested the influence on credit rating of propensity for earnings 
management (EM) and tax management (TM). The results indicate as earnings management 
increases, ratings tend to decline, while firms that engage in aggressive tax management are not 
penalized. The study of this phenomenon can help to predict the credit rating in Brazil, and 
would allow identifying factors that affect it and actions to reduce the perception of risks to 
solvency, and consequently the cost of debt. 
                                                          
1Artigo recebido em 10.112015. Revisado por pares em 06.03.2016. Reformulado em 30.08.2016. Recomendado 
para publicação em 20.09.2016 por Paulo Roberto da Cunha. Publicado em 27.09.2016. Organização responsável 
pelo periódico: FURB. 
92 




Revista Universo Contábil, ISSN 1809-3337, FURB, Blumenau, v. 12, n. 3, p. 91-109, jul./set., 2016 
Keywords: Book-tax differences; Earnings management; Bonds; Rating. 
 
Resumo 
O presente estudo investigou se o rating de crédito na emissão de debênture no mercado 
brasileiro é determinado em parte pelas diferenças entre o lucro contábil e tributário (BTD), 
bem como práticas de gerenciamento de resultados. Esta relação foi realizada mediante estudo 
de todas empresas que emitiram debêntures no período de 2004 a 2014 e que dispõem das 
informações financeiras publicadas, exceto as empresas financeiras, resultando em uma 
amostra final de 96 observações. Os resultados indicam que a BTD não determina o rating de 
crédito no mercado brasileiro. Adicionalmente, foi testada a determinação do rating de crédito 
pela propensão ao gerenciamento de resultado (EM) contábil e o tributário (TA). Os resultados 
indicaram que as empresas que gerenciam o seu resultado contábil para aumentá-lo são 
penalizadas com um rebaixamento, ao passo que as empresas propensas a um planejamento 
tributário mais agressivo não são penalizadas. O estudo deste fenómeno pode ajudar a estimar 
o rating de crédito no Brasil, e permitir identificar os fatores que o afetam e as ações para reduzir 
a percepção de riscos para a solvência e, consequentemente, o custo da dívida. 
Palavras Chave: Diferença entre lucro contábil e tributário; Gerenciamento de resultado 
contábil; Debêntures; Ratings. 
 
Resumen 
Este estudio investigó si la calificación crediticia de la emisión de obligaciones en el mercado 
brasileño está determinada en parte por las diferencias entre el resultado contable y tributaria 
(BTD) y practicas de earnings management. Esta relación fue realizado por el estudio de todas 
las empresas que han emitido bonos 2004-2014 y que tengamos la información financiera 
publicada, excepto las sociedades financieras, lo que resulta en una muestra final de 96 
observaciones. Los resultados indican que BTD no determina la calificación crediticia en el 
mercado brasileño. Además, se puso a prueba la determinación de la calificación crediticia de 
la propensión a gestión de resultados (GI) contable y planeamiento tributario (TA). Los 
resultados indicaron que las empresas a gestionar su valor en libros para aumentarla se 
penalizada con la rebaja, mientras que las empresas con tendencia a la gestión tributaria no son 
penalizados. El estudio de este fenómeno puede ayudar a predecir la calificación de crédito en 
Brasil, y permitiría la identificación de los factores que la afectan y las acciones para reducir la 
percepción de los riesgos para la solvencia, y por lo tanto el costo de la deuda. 




This article examines whether bond credit ratings in the Brazilian market are influenced 
by the differences between book income and taxable income, or book-tax differences, as well 
for earnings management practices. The credit rating expresses the opinion of a particular rating 
agency on the capacity and predisposition of a firm to meet its financial obligations fully and 
timely (STANDARD & POOR’S, 2011).  
Many studies (HAND; HOLTHAUSEN and LEFTWICH 1992; ZIEBART; RIETER 
1992; BLUME, LIM and MACKINLAY 1998; CHENG and SUBRAMANYAM 2008) have 
found evidence that agencies use both public and private financial information, and this 
information directly affects the credit rating. 
Ahmed, Billings, Morton and Stanford-Harris (2002) found the credit rating is positively 
associated with accounting conservatism, i.e., more conservative firms tend to have higher 
credit ratings. Additionally, Francis et al. (2005) demonstrated the rating is positively associated 
with the quality of accruals. 
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In this respect, the book-tax difference can be broken down into two portions: the non-
discretionary part of the permanent differences between the financial numbers according to tax 
and accounting rules (NBTD – normal book-tax differences); and the discretionary part of those 
differences (ABTD – abnormal book-tax differences). This second portion can be caused by 
earnings management (EM) and tax management (TM).  
Tang (2006), Formigoni, Antunes and Paulo (2009) and Martinez and Passamani (2014) 
have all presented evidence that ABTD is a proxy for the quality of earnings, since it indicates 
managers are trying to increase the accounting income and reduce the taxable income (Ferreira 
et al., 2012). Therefore, the rating agencies’ analysts can interpret BTDs as an indication of 
reduced quality of earnings, thus posing a risk factor to the target firm’s solvency, prompting 
them to lower the credit rating (AYRES, LAPLANTE and MCQUIRE, 2010). 
The study of this phenomenon is relevant due to the internationalization of the financial 
markets and the growing diversification of the sources of capital. Therefore, a model can help 
predict the credit rating would allow identifying factors that affect it and actions to reduce the 
perception of risks to solvency, and consequently the cost of debt (KIM and GU, 2004; GRAY, 
MIRKOVIC and RAGUNATHAN, 2006). Another factor makes this study relevant is the 
absence of studies of the effect of book-tax differences on ratings in the Brazilian market. 
Therefore, our research question is the following: Can the credit rating of bond issues in the 
Brazilian market be explained in part by book-tax differences? 
The article is organized into five sections including this introduction. In the second 
section we briefly review the relevant literature and present our two research hypotheses. In the 
third section we present the methodology and propose the regression models. In the fourth 
section we analyze the results, before presenting our conclusions and suggestions for future 
research in the fifth section. 
 
2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
Here we review the concepts and contributions in the literature on the informative 
potential of book-tax differences, and summarize some important previous findings on the use 
of this information by rating agencies. 
 
2.1 Information contained in book-tax differences 
2.1.1 Book-tax differences 
Book-tax differences occur because of the different standards for reporting accounting 
income, tailored to meet the needs of investors and other users according to generally accepted 
accounting principles – GAAP (in Brazil via pronouncements from the Accounting 
Pronouncements Committee – CPC, along with Laws 11,638/2007 and 11,941/2009 and various 
resolutions from the Federal Accounting Council - CFC), and the rules imposed by the tax 
authorities, which rely on the GAAP structure with the adjustments determined by tax 
legislation. 
In Brazil, there are two levies on profits, both at the federal level. The first is Corporate 
Income Tax (IRPJ) and the second is Social Contribution on Net Profit (CSLL). There are also 
four different tax regimes, basically depending on firm size: real profit (for large firms), 
presumed profit (for midsize companies), arbitrated profit (only used at the imposition of the 
tax administration when there is a lack of information or in rare cases at the behest of the firm), 
and Simples Nacional (for micro and small enterprises). 
The firms in our sample were all subject to the real profit regime during the study period. 
Under this regime, IRPJ and CSLL are calculated based on the accounting income as 
determined by corporate legislation, adjusted by the additions and exclusions defined by tax 
legislation (namely articles 249 and 250 of Decree 3,000/1999, better known as the Income Tax 
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Regulation). The IRPJ rate is 15% plus a surcharge of 10% on annual profit over R$ 240,000.00, 
and the CSLL rate is 9%, so the effective income tax rate for the majority of large firms is 34%, 
the figure assumed in this study. 
In 2008, as part of the process of harmonizing local accounting practices to International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), initiated by Law 11,638/2007, Provisional Measure 
449/2008 was issued (converted into Law 11,941/2009). Among other matters, this created the 
“transitional taxation regime” (RTT), to assure the effects of accounting convergence would not 
have tax impacts, with the rules as of December 31, 2007 remaining valid, so as to neutralize 
the effect of the accounting procedures and rules brought by the new corporate legislation. The 
RTT generally caused a greater gap between book income and taxable income starting in 2007, 
but it was revoked in 2013 by Provisional Measure 627, converted into Law 12,973 in 2014. 
The two standards give rise to differences with permanent characteristics, i.e., when 
revenues or expenses in a period are only recognized for accounting purpose, and temporary 
differences, when transactions are recorded for both accounting and tax purposes, but in 
different periods (MARTINEZ and PASSAMANI, 2014). Therefore, temporary differences 
between book and taxable income (TBTD) are characterized by deferred recognition of taxable 
income, and hence of taxes. These can either be positive (higher accounting than taxable 
income) or negative (lower book than taxable income) (HANLON, 2005). 
According to the classification in the literature, the permanent differences caused by the 
mismatch between accounting and tax rules compose the nondiscretionary portion of BTD 
(NBTD – normal book-tax differences) while the discretionary part of BTD (ABTD – abnormal 
book-tax differences) can be caused by earnings management (EM) and tax management (TM) 
(TANG, 2006; FORMIGONI, ANTUNES and PAULO, 2009; MARTINEZ and PASSAMANI, 
2014). 
 
2.1.2 Informative potential of BTD 
As noted by Ferreira (2012), BTD has been a recurrent topic in the recent business 
literature, due to its relevance to the two most important users of accounting information, the 
government and shareholders (Shackel-Ford and Shevlin, 2001; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010; 
Graham, Raedy and Shackelford, 2012). Additionally, Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) state BTD 
is an important and promising topic in international studies of taxation. 
In this respect, some international and Brazilian studies in the recent literature related 
to various aspects of the informational content of BTD can be mentioned, such as the 
persistence of earnings (PHILLIPS et al., 2003; HANLON, 2005; BLAYLOCK et al., 2012; 
MARTINEZ and SOUZA, 2015), earnings and tax management (TANG, 2006; FORMIGONI, 
ANTUNES and PAULO, 2009), profit growth (JACKSON, 2009), prediction of bankruptcy 
(SCHNADER and NOGA, 2013) and credit analysis (AYRES, LAPLANTE and McGUIRE, 
2010). 
Among these studies, we highlight the analysis of the deterioration of earnings quality 
of firms that present large BTDs, since managers have incentives to maximize book income and 
reduce taxable income (FERREIRA et al., 2012).  
According to Hanlon and Heitzman (2010), BTD is a relevant indicator of the earnings 
quality, as revealed by associations between firms’ current and future results. An extensive 
literature suggests BTD contributes to the risk of reduced earnings quality (NOGA & 
SCHNADER, 2013), in which firms that present large BTDs have less persistent profits 
(PHILLIPS et al., 2003; HANLON, 2005; BLAYLOCK et al., 2012). 
In this respect, Hanlon (2005) examined BTD as an indicator of the persistence of 
earnings, accruals and cash flow, and also assessed the evaluation of investors about the 
predictability of future results. She used data covering the period from 1994 to 2000 on 4,050 
firms, for total of 14,106 firm-years. She concluded companies in the sample with large BTDs 
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disclosed less persistent profits compared to firms with small BTDs, and also investors interpret 
the profits of the former firms as a “red flag” to reduce their expectations about future profits. 
Jackson (2009) examined the relationship between profit growth and BTD, dividing it 
into its two components (ABTD and NBTD), and tested the relationship of these components 
with changes in net profits as well as changes in pre-tax profits and tax costs. The author found 
large differences between accounting and taxable income indicate low quality and less 
persistence of earnings. Additionally, it was observed slower growth of profits of firms with 
large BTDs due to earnings management. 
Tang (2006) investigated the potential of BTD to reveal earnings and tax management, 
by testing the associations between ABTDs and incentives for earnings and tax management. 
The results showed firms with large incentives and propensity for earnings management 
presented high ABTD levels, making it a good proxy to analyze the management of accounting 
and tax information after controlling for NBTD. 
In the context of credit analysis, Ayers, Laplante and McGuire (2010) studied the 
interpretation of credit analysts about the information contained in BTDs and detected both 
positive and negative book-tax differences (PBTDs and NBTDs respectively) result in less 
favorable ratings. In other words, variations in BTDs are taken as a negative signal by ratings 
agencies. But they also found the propensity for tax management tends to attenuate rating 
downgrades. 
With respect to the use of the information contained in BTD to forecast bankruptcy, 
Schnader and Noga (2013) investigated the association between changes in ABTD and the 
predictability of bankruptcy, concluding that this information significantly increases the 
probability of bankruptcy, so it can be used as a tool to identify firms that are more likely to go 
bust. 
The Brazilian literature contains only a few studies related to BTD, such as Formigoni, 
Antunes and Paulo (2009), Ferreira et al. (2012), Machado and Nakao (2012), Martinez and 
Passamani (2014) and Martinez and Souza, (2015). Among these, we can highlight the work of 
Formigoni, Antunes and Paulo (2009), who analyzed the composition of BTD to identify and 
explain whether this difference tends to be the result of earnings management and/or tax 
management. However, they did not find a statistically significant relation between the two 
practices and BTD. 
Therefore, following the footsteps of Ayres, Laplante and McGuire (2010), our aim here 
is to investigate the impact of the informative potential of BTD, as evidenced in the literature, 
and also of earnings and tax management, on external users, in particular the credit ratings of 
bond issues assigned by rating agencies. 
 
2.2 The debt market and credit ratings 
According to the National Association of Financial Market Institutions (Andima, 2008, 
p. 50), bonds are defined as a security issued by a corporation, representing a fraction of a loan 
(Law 6,385/76, art. 2, I) originating from a loan contract between the issuing company and the 
purchasers (bondholders, represented by a fiduciary agent), that grants to the latter a credit right 
against the former, according to the indenture and certificate (Law 6,404/76, art. 52).  
The issuing company can make one or more issues –each possibly divided into series, 
with those of the same series having equal nominal value and conferring the same rights on 
their holders (Law 6,404/76, art. 53). In Brazil, issuance of bonds has been the main source of 
funding in the capital market since the economic stabilization in 1994 (Real Plan), a trend was 
particularly evident in 2005 and 2006 (PIMENTEL, PERES & LIMA, 2011). According to 
those authors, most of the money raised through bond issues in the period from 1995 to 2009 
was by leasing companies, which accounted for 63.4% of the total.  
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Nevertheless, Pimentel et al. (2008) identified various factors preventing greater 
development of the domestic bond market, among them a relatively unreliable accounting and 
auditing system and low efficiency in predicting insolvency and assigning credit ratings. 
With respect to credit ratings, starting in 2001 it became increasingly common for firms 
to retain rating agencies to classify their placements of securities, in response to Resolutions 
2,720/00 and 2,829/00 from the National Monetary Council (CMN), requiring “low credit risk” 
ratings of bonds held in the portfolios of private pension funds (ANDIMA, 2008). Furthermore, 
in this respect, the growing internationalization of markets and consequent diversification of 
the forms and sources of funding have also increased the need for favorable ratings from 
respective agencies, to enable Brazilian firms to raise money in the foreign debt markets. 
Rating agencies issue classifications for both corporate and sovereign debt. In the 
corporate case, the agencies express an opinion on the capacity and disposition of the issuing 
firm to meet its financial obligations timely (Standard & Poor’s, 2011). Likewise, the sovereign 
credit rating is an estimate of the issuing government’s capacity to honor its debts, over the long 
term (FITCH RATINGS, 2012). 
The credit ratings by the main agencies are denoted by letter symbols, indicating the 
categories used by Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch. However, to demonstrate firms’ 
capacity to honor their financial commitments, Standard & Poor’s and Fitch use 22 different 
ratings, while Moody’s uses 21, as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 – Ordinal classification of the ratings attributed by the main agencies 
















AAA AAA Aaa 22 
AA+ AA+ Aa1 21 
AA AA Aa2 20 
AA- AA- Aa3 19 
A+ A+ A1 18 
A A A2 17 
A- A- A3 16 
BBB+ BBB+ Baa1 15 
BBB BBB Baa2 14 
















BB+ BB+ Ba1 12 
BB BB Ba2 11 
BB- BB- Ba3 10 
B+ B+ B1 9 
B B B2 8 
B- B- B3 7 
CCC+ CCC+ Caa1 6 
CCC CCC Caa2 5 
CCC- CCC- Caa3 4 
CC CC Ca 3 
C C C 2 
D D   1 
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2.3 Utilization of accounting information in credit rating 
2.3.1 Credit rating agencies and their role in the solvency of the market 
Since the end of the 1980s the demand for information related to credit analysis has 
grown drastically in the international financial market, prompting the development of many 
methods for this purpose (Callado et al., 2008). Therefore, the importance of the credit rating 
agencies has grown commensurately (CALDERONI, COLLA & GATTI, 2009).  
From the standpoint of firms, the credit rating has great practical importance, since it 
has a direct impact on their cost of debt, financial structure and capacity to continue placing 
debt securities (GRAY et al., 2006). 
From the market’s viewpoints, credit rating agencies play an important role in 
complementing the systems to evaluate solvency, in particular the examination and monitoring 
activities of investment analysts and providers of corporate debt (ADAMS et al., 2003). 
In the Brazilian context, the importance of credit rating agencies is not as great, but their 
role has been growing, especially as the country gains relevance in the global economy. 
Therefore, the Brazilian market presents a scenario propitious for studies related to credit 
ratings (MURCIA, MURCIA & BORBA, 2014). 
In view of the large importance of ratings in the solvency of the international financial 
market, studies of the possible information used to assign credit ratings have informative 
potential for the agents involved in credit transactions, since according to Kim and Gu (2004), 
a model able to predict a firm’s rating would enable identifying the factors that affect those 
ratings, allowing actions to reduce the risk perception and hence the cost of debt. 
However, it is not possible to know all the variables employed by the agencies in 
determining their ratings. Although they all publish general guides to evaluate their ratings, they 
never provide details about the financial variables are most important (KIM & GU, 2004). 
In a recent study of the determinants of credit ratings in the Brazilian market, Murcia, 
Murcia and Borba (2014) identified five relevant classes of variables, which are listed below in 
Chart 1, together with the studies that attest to their significance. 
 
Chart 1 - Significant determinants of credit ratings in the Brazilian market 
DETERMINANT 
STUDIES HAVE DEMONSTRATED THE SIGNIFICANCE 
OF THE DETERMINANT 
Leverage 
Adams, Burton and Hardwick (2003); Gray, Mirkovic and 
Ragunathan (2006); Damasceno, Artes and Minardi (2008); Shiu 
e Chiang (2008); 
Profitability 
Bouzouita e Young (1998); Adams, Burton and Hardwick 
(2003); Kim and Gu (2004); Gray, Mirkovic and Ragunathan 
(2006); López (2007); Damasceno, Artes and Minardi (2008); 
Shiu and Chiang (2008); Matousek and Stewart (2009); 
Sales Growth Bouzouita and Young (1998); Shiu and Chiang (2008); 
Financial Market Performance Murcia (2014) 
Internationalization Murcia (2014) 
Source: Adapted from Murcia, Murcia and Borba (2014). 
 
2.3.2 Credit ratings and book-tax differences 
In assigning credit ratings, the agencies use different methods. Some focus only on 
quantitative data while others also consider qualitative information, obtained through meetings 
with representatives of firms or governments (STANDARD & POOR’S, 2011). 
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The first studies of the use of quantitative data obtained from accounting reports date 
from the 1960s (DAMASCENO, 2008). Since then, many papers have investigated the use of 
accounting information by rating agencies, analyzing various accounting metrics, such as the 
capacity to pay interest (interest coverage), percent of financing of assets, profitability and firm 
size. Rating agencies use all these metrics in their analyses (AYRES, LAPLANTE & 
MCGUIRE, 2010). 
More specifically, studies like Hand, Holthausen and Leftwich (1992), Ziebart and 
Rieter (1992), Blume, Lim and Mackinlay (1998), and Cheng and Subramanyam (2008) have 
found agencies use both public and private information, and that financial information directly 
affects the credit rating. 
According to Ahmed, Billings, Morton and Stanford-Harris (2002), the credit rating is 
positively associated with accounting conservatism, i.e., more conservative firms tend to obtain 
higher credit ratings. Additionally, Francis et al. (2005) demonstrated the rating is positively 
associated with the quality of accruals. 
In this respect, since BTD is a proxy for the earnings quality, users of accounting 
information can interpret it as a risk factor in estimating the solvency of firms, making it a 
variable that potentially influences credit ratings in the Brazilian market. 
However, according to Weber (2009), the market tends to underestimate the risks 
involved in high BTDs, so this metric is not correctly priced, even though other studies on credit 
ratings have validated the utility of BTD in forecasting financial difficulties. 
No previous studies have analyzed the use of the information contained in BTD in 
determining credit ratings in the Brazilian market, although some recent works have used this 
metric in their models of accounting information quality, such as Brito and Neto (2008), 
Damasceno, Arte and Minard (2008), Paulo, Calvacante and Melo (2012), and Fernandino, 
Takamatsu and Lamounier (2014). 
Among these we highlight the study by Fernandino, Takamatsu and Lamounier (2014), 
who evaluated the influence of accounting indexes on the predictability of the credit ratings of 
listed Brazilian corporations issued by Fitch Ratings. Their regression models obtained a 
satisfactory level of significance, especially the variables size and return on assets. 
Therefore, the literature discussed on BTDs and credit ratings presents strong 
indications of this association in the Brazilian market. In other words, rating agencies’ analysts 
can use this information in determining the credit rating, leading to our first hypothesis: 
H1 – The credit rating of bond issues in the Brazilian market can be partly explained by 
BTD. 
In light of the division of BTD into two parts, discretionary (ABTD – abnormal book-
tax differences), which can be caused by earnings management (EM) and/or tax management 
(TM) (TANG, 2006; FORMIGONI, ANTUNES & PAULO, 2009; MARTINEZ & 
PASSAMANI, 2014), the propensity to engage in earnings management and tax management 
can be utilized by agencies in attributing credit ratings to bond issues. This leads to our second 
hypothesis: 
H2 – The credit rating of bond issues is partly explained by the propensity to engage in 
earnings and tax management practices. 
 
3 METHODOLOGY 
Our objective is to analyze the behavior of the credit ratings of bond issues in the 
Brazilian market, by analyzing the variables identified in the literature. Hence, this study can 
be classified as explanatory and descriptive, according to the criteria of Gil (2008). Regarding 
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methodology, it is quantitative, since it involves the collection and treatment of quantitative 
data for the purpose of validating or invalidating a scientific question. 
 
3.1 Development of the econometric models 
3.1.1 Model 1 – Book-tax differences as determinants of credit ratings 
To test H1 we applied an econometric model in which the independent variable is the 
credit ratings announced on the issuance of bonds (Ratingt) and the dependent variable of 
interest is the differences between book and taxable income (BTDt-1). Murcia et al. (2014) found 
five variables with a significant effect on the determination of the credit rating in the Brazilian 
market, namely: financial leverage (LEVt-1), profitability (PROFt-1), sales growth (GROWt-1), 
financial market performance (PERFt-1) and level of internationalization (INTERt-1). We also 
used these as control variables, along with size, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets 
(logAt-1), and Brazil’s investment grade rating (BIGt-1). 
The Brazilian investment grade variable (BIGt-1) is necessary because in 2008 Brazil for 
the first time in its history received this rating from the main agencies, and this level was 
maintained until the end of our sample period. This means as of that moment, Brazil was among 
the countries with the lowest perceived risk of default on sovereign debt, making it a favorable 
destination for investments, with a positive reflection on the credit ratings of Brazilian firms. 
Therefore, to analyze the influence of BTD on the credit rating of Brazilian firms, we 
used the following model: 
Ratingit =  β0 + β1BTDit-1+β2logAit-1+β 3BIGit-1+ β4LEVit-1+β5PROFit-1+β6GROWit-1 
+β7PERFit-1+ β8INTERit-1 + εit 
Where: 
Ratingit = credit rating of firm i in year t; 
α is the constant and β is the estimated coefficient of the regression; 
BTDit-1= book-tax difference of firm i in year t-1; 
LogAit-1  = log of total assets of firm i in year t-1; 
BIGit-1 = investment grade classification of Brazil in year t-1; 
LEVit-1= financial leverage of firm i in year t-1; 
PROFit-1 = profitability of firm i in year t-1 
GROWit-1 = growth of sales revenue of firm i from year t-2 to t-1 t-1; 
PERFit-1 = financial market performance of firm i in year t-1; 
INTERit-1= internationalization of firm i in year t-1; 
εit= residual of the regression for firm i in year t-1. 
 
Chart 2 presents the methods used to determine each variable in the proposed model. 
Chart 2 – Determination of the variables 
VARIABLE DETERMINATION OF THE VARIABLE 
Ratingit Credit rating disclosed on the issuance of bonds. 
BTDit-1 
Calculated by the difference between EBIT and taxable income, with EBIT being obtained by 
dividing taxes on profits (IRPJ and CSLL) by the rate of 34%, scaled by total assets at t-1, as 
done by Ferreira (2012).   
logAit-1 Natural logarithm of total assets. 
BIGit-1 Dummy variable, with value 1 for ratings in years when Brazil had investment grade 
classification and 0 in other years. 
LEVit-1 
Calculated by dividing the sum of current and long-term assets by total assets. 
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PROFit-1 Calculated by dividing net profit by stockholders’ equity. 
GROWit-1 Growth of sales revenue of firm i from year t-2 to t-1. 
PERFit-1 Calculated by dividing market value by stockholders’ equity. 
INTERit-1 
Dummy variable with value 1 for firms that issued ADRs and 0 for other firms. 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 
3.1.2 Model 2 – Propensity to engage in earnings management and tax 
management as a determinant of credit rating 
To test H2, we used the same model proposed to test H1, but substituted BTDt-1 by the 
propensity of manage earnings (EM dummyt-1) and taxes (TM dummyt-1). 
Therefore, to analyze the determination of credit rating by the propensity to engage in 
earnings and tax management, we used the following model: 
Ratingit =β0 + β1EM dummyit-1+β2TM dummyit-1+ β3logAit-1β 4BIGit-1+ β5LEVit-1+β6PROFit-1 
+β7GROWit-1+β8PERFit-1+ β9INTERit-1 + εit   
Where: 
Ratingit = credit rating of firm i in year t; 
α is the constant and β is the estimated coefficient of the regression; 
EM dummyit-1= proxy for earnings management of firm i in year t-1; 
TM dummyit-1= proxy of tax aggressiveness of firm i in year t-1; 
LogAit-1  = log of total assets of firm i in year t-1; 
BIGit-1 = investment grade classification of Brazil in year t-1; 
LEVit-1= financial leverage of firm i in year t-1; 
PROFit-1 = profitability of firm i in year t-1 
GROWit-1 = growth of sales revenue of firm i from year t-2 to t-1 t-1; 
PERFit-1 = financial market performance of firm i in year t-1; 
INTERit-1= internationalization of firm i in year t-1; 
εit= residual of the regression for firm i in year t-1; 
Chart 3 presents th methods used to determine the variables of the second model. 
 
Chart 3 – Determination of the variables 
VARIABLE DETERMINATION OF THE VARIABLE 
Ratingit 
Credit rating disclosed on the issuance of bonds, converted into an ordinal classification from 
22 to 1, as shown in Table 1. 
EM dummy it-1 
Calculated through the residuals of the discretionary accruals model of Jones (1991), adjusted 
for performance according to Kothari et al. (2005), assuming value of 1 for firms above the 
3rd quartile and 0 for other firms. 
TM dummyit-1 
Calculated by dividing taxes on profit (IRPJ and CSLL) by EBIT, i.e., the effective tax rate, 
assuming value of 1 for firms below the 1st quartile and 0 for other firms. 
logAit-1 Natural logarithm of total assets. 
BIGit-1 
Dummy variable, with value 1 for ratings in years when Brazil had investment grade 
classification and 0 in other years. 
LEVit-1 
Calculated by dividing the sum of current and non-current assets by total assets. 
PROFit-1 Calculated by dividing net profit by stockholders’ equity. 
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GROWit-1 Growth of sales revenue of firm i from year t-2 to t-1. 
PERFit-1 Calculated by dividing market value by stockholders’ equity. 
INTERit-1 Dummy variable with value 1 for firms that issued ADRs and 0 for other firms. 
 Source: Prepared by the authors. 
As described in Chart 4, in calculating EMdummyit-1 we used the discretionary accruals 
model of Jones (1991), adjusted for performance according to Kothari (2005), Where: 
 
TACt-1 = total accruals of firm i in year t-1; 
∆SALESit-1 = variation of sales revenue of firm i from year t-2 to t-1, scaled by total assets at 
the start of the year; 
∆ARit-1 = variation of accounts receivable of firm from year t-2 to t-1, scaled by total assets at 
the start of the year; 
NCAit-1 = non-current assets in year t-1 scaled by total assets of the previous year; 
ROAit-1 = return on assets, calculated as net profit before extraordinary items divided by total 
assets at the start of the year. 
 
The independent variable TAC (total accruals) used in the performance-adjusted Jones 
model was calculated as follows: 
 
TACit-1 = [(ΔACit-1 - ΔPPEit-1) – (ΔPCit-1 -ΔDivit-1) – Deprit-1] / Ait-2 
Where: 
TACit-1 = total accruals of firm i in year t-1; 
ΔCAit-1 = variation of current assets of firm i from the end of year t-2 to the end of year t-1; 
ΔPPEit-1= variation of property, plant and equipment of firm i from the end of year t-2 to the 
end of year t-1 t-1; 
ΔCLit-1 = variation of current liabilities of firm i from the end of year t-2 to the end of year t-1 
t-1; 
ΔDebtit-1= variation of short-term loans and financing of firm i from the end of year t-2 to the 
end of year t-1 t-1; 
Deprit-1= amount of depreciation and amortization expenses of firm i during year t-1. 
Ait-1= total assets of firm i in year t-1; 
 
3.2 Sample and data collection 
The sample was composed of companies with shares listed on the BM&FBovespa that 
issued bonds in the period from 2004 to 2014 and had sufficient financial information published 
to calculate the variables. 
We collected the data from the Economática® database, using the following filters: i) 
location country: Brazil; ii) type of asset: stock; iii) class: ON/PN (common/preferred); iv) 
exchange: BM&FBovespa; v) active or canceled: active; vi) utilize consolidated data; vii) 
currency: thousands of reais; viii) financial statement date: December 31, 20XX. 
In turn, we obtained the credit ratings from the announcements of bond issues available 
at the site of Anbima (Brazilian Association of Financial and Capital Market Entities), in the 
period from 2004 to 2014. 
 
3.3 Treatment of the data 
During the period studied, we found 271 bond issue announcements, distributed by year 
as shown in Table 2 below. 
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As can be seen, there was strong concentration of bond issue announcements in 2005, 
2006 and 2007, corresponding to 48.34% of the total. Of these 271 announcements, 23 did not 
indicate a credit rating. In this respect, according to Resolutions 2,720/00 and 2,829/00 from 
the National Monetary Council (CMN), classification is optional in some cases. 
Table 2 – Distribution of bond issues per year 
YEAR NUMBER YEAR NUMBER 
2004 33 2010 19 
2005 44 2011 6 
2006 45 2012 15 
2007 42 2013 14 
2008 26 2014 8 
2009 19 TOTAL 271 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 
We dropped these observations from the sample, resulting in a sample of 248 
observations, as in Table 3: 
 
Table 3 – Summary of the credit ratings of bond issues 
CREDIT RATING ORDINAL CLASSIFICATION No. of Observations 
AAA or Aaa 22 32 
AA+ or Aa1 21 25 
AA or Aa2 20 34 
AA- or Aa3 19 31 
A+ or A1 18 31 
A or A2 17 51 
A- or A3 16 19 
BBB+ or Baa1 15 14 
BBB or Baa2 14 7 
BBB- or Baa3 13 1 
BB+ or Ba1 12 2 
BB or Ba2 11 0 
BB- or Ba3 10 0 
B+ or B1 9 0 
B or B1 8 0 
B-  or B3 7 0 
CCC+ or Caa1 6 0 
CCC or Caa2 5 1 
CCC- or Caa3 4 0 
CC or Ca 3 0 
C or C 2 0 
D 1 0 
TOTAL 248 
Source: Prepared by the authors.     
Among these 248 observations we found some firms that launched more than one bond 
issue in a year, and others that had more than one rating for different series. In these cases, we 
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chose the worst rating, based on the tendency of analysts to do the same, out of prudence. 
Therefore, we excluded 11 observations. Additionally, for 81 observations there was 
insufficient financial information in the Economática® database to calculate all our variables, 
and 50 observations pertained to financial institutions, which have specific accounting 
standards, making their numbers not comparable with those of other firms. Therefore, we 
excluded 131 observations from the sample.  
Finally, for the variable TM, which represents the effective tax rate, we only considered 
observations with a result between 0 and 1, so we excluded a further 10 observations. The final 
sample was composed of 96 observations, with practically all the firms having been classified 
as investment grade, as can be seen in Table 4: 
Table 4 – Summary of the final sample 
CREDIT RATING ORDINAL CLASSIFICATION No. of Observations 
AAA or Aaa 22 5 
AA+ or Aa1 21 10 
AA or Aa2 20 10 
AA- or Aa3 19 12 
A+ or A1 18 17 
A or A2 17 26 
A- or A3 16 7 
BBB+ or Baa1 15 6 
BBB or Baa2 14 2 
BBB- or Baa3 13 0 
BB+ or Ba1 12 1 
BB or Ba2 11 0 
BB- or Ba3 10 0 
B+ or B1 9 0 
B or B1 8 0 
B-  or B3 7 0 
CCC+ or Caa1 6 0 
CCC or Caa2 5 0 
CCC- or Caa3 4 0 
CC or Ca 3 0 
C or C 2 0 
D 1 0 
TOTAL 96 
Source: Prepared by the authors.     
 
With respect to the treatment of the data obtained from the Economática® database, two 
small adjustments were made starting in 2010 in the nomenclature used. Therefore, the variable 
variation of non-current assets in the calculation of total accruals (ACT) was obtained as RealLT 
(realizable in the long term) from 2004 to 2009 and from 2010 onward as NonCurrAss (non-
current assets). Likewise, the variable variation of available cash assets in calculating total 
accruals (ATC) was obtained from 2004 to 2009 as CashSTInv (cash and short-term 
investments) and from 2010 onward as CCEquiv (cash and cash equivalents). 
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4 RESULT ANALYSIS 
Interpreting the data an empirical analysis is necessary, and the first step consisted in 
calculate the descriptive statistics of the variables, as indicated in Table 5. In the preliminary 
analysis of the descriptive statistics, among the possible observations we highlight the BTD 
metric mainly shows positive values, meaning higher accounting than taxable income. This 
indicates most firms had a propensity to manage earnings and taxes, by increasing accounting 
income and reducing taxable income (FERREIRA et al., 2012). 
Table 5 – Descriptive Statistics 
VARIABLE MEAN MEDIAN 
STAND. 
DEV. 
VAR MINIMUM MAXIMUM Q1 Q3 
RATING 18.10 18.00 2.04 4.18 12.00 22.00 17.00 20.00 
BTD 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.05 0.20 0.00 0.03 
BTD RTT 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.08 0.08 0.08 
BTD T 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.15 0.16 0.00 0.02 
EM dummy 0.32 0.00 0.47 0.22 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
EM 0.00 -0.01 0.15 0.02 -0.59 0.71 -0.06 0.05 
EM abs 0.09 0.06 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.71 0.02 0.09 
TM 0.29 0.29 0.13 0.02 0.10 0.86 0.22 0.33 
TM dummy 0.25 0.00 0.44 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.25 
LEV 0.67 0.65 0.19 0.04 0.13 1.09 0.55 0.79 
PROF 0.30 0.23 0.31 0.10 -0.24 2.33 0.13 0.38 
SIZE 6.69 6.63 0.44 0.20 5.76 7.73 6.40 7.05 
GROW 0.14 0.09 0.19 0.04 -0.03 1.30 0.05 0.17 
PERF 3.04 1.92 4.13 17.08 -5.95 25.43 1.31 3.18 
INTERN 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 
BIG 0.42 0.00 0.50 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
 
 Table 6 presents the results obtained from the equation of discretionary accruals of Jones 
(1991), adjusted for performance according to Kothari et al. (2005). In turn, we used their 
residuals to calculate the dummy variable for EM, according to Chart 4, as presented in the 
methodology section (Section 3). 
Table 6 – Discretionary Accruals 
VARIABLES COEFFICIENTS T-STAT 
1/ASSETSt-1 166547.800      7.150*** 
∆SALESt-1-∆ARt-1 -0.059 -0.902 
NCAt-1 0.147     3.094*** 
ROAt-1 0.002 0.007 
Adjusted R² 0.391  
Prob > F 0.000  
Number of obs. 96  
This table presents the results of the model of Jones (1991) adjusted for performance according to Kothari et al. 
(2005). .***,** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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4.1 Results of model 1 – BTD as a determinant of credit rating 
Table 7 presents the results of Model 1 with all the variables (complete) and excluding 
the control variables not found to be significant at 10% (adjusted), for the purpose of improving 
the proposed model: 
 
Table 7 - Model 1 – BTD as a determinant of credit rating 
VARIABLE 
COMPLETE ADJUSTED 
COEFFICIENT T-STAT COEFFICIENT T-STAT 
BTD 4.319 0.775 3.782 0.748 
logA 1.668    3.272*** 1.711 
   
4.216**
* 
BIG 1.640    4.500*** 1.640 
   
4.700**
* 
LEV -2.010  -1.955* -2.132 
 -
2.177** 
PROF -0.006 -0.009 - - 
GROW -2.000  -1.876* -1.684 -1.728* 
PERF 0.047 0.892 - - 
INTERN. 0.174 0.316 - - 
Adjusted R² 0.328 0.342 
Prob> F 0.000 0.000 
Number of obs. 96 96 
This table presents the results of Model 1 (complete): Ratingit = β0 + β1BTDit-1 + β2logAit-1 + β3BIGit-1 + β4LEVit-
1 + β5PROFit-1 + β6GROWit-1 + β7PERFit-1 + β8INTERit-1 + εit , and Model 1 (adjusted): Ratingit = β0 + β1BTDit-
1 + β2logAit-1 + β3BIGit-1 + β4LEVit-1 + β5GROWit-1 + εit. The adjusted model excluded the variables PROFTit-1, 
PERFit-1 e INTERit-1.***,** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Source: Prepared by the authors.   
The results of Model 1 do not provide evidence that differences between book and 
taxable income determine the credit rating, thus not confirming H1. However, we point out that 
all the control variables of Model 1 (adjusted) are significant except for GROWt-1, confirming 
the prediction of the sign for determination of credit rating, as indicated in Chart 3 of the 
methodology section (Section 3). 
This finding runs contrary to others reported in the literature, in which various studies 
have shown the utility of BTD, such as in predicting financial difficulties (Schnader & Noga, 
2013), persistence and deterioration of earnings (Phillips et al., 2003; Hanlon, 2005; Blaylock 
et al., 2012), indication of earnings and tax management (TANG, 2006; FORMIGONI, 
ANTUNES & PAULO, 2009) and profits growth (JACKSON, 2009). 
Specifically regarding analysis of credit ratings, we mention the article of Ayres, 
Laplante and McGuire (2010), who showed evidence that both positive and negative variations 
in BTD are factors influencing credit rating downgrades in the American market. We were 
unable to employ this method due to the limitation of the sample, so we focused on analyzing 
the determination of the rating by the level of BTD rather than its variation. 
Nevertheless, according to Weber (2009), the market tends to underestimate the risks 
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4.2 Results of Model 2 – Propensity for earnings and tax management as 
determinants of credit rating 
Table 8 reports the results of Model 2, with all the variables (complete) and excluding 
the control variables not found to be significant at 10% (adjusted), for the purpose of improving 
the proposed model: 
 





STAT COEFFICIENT T-STAT 
EMdummy -1.020   -2.401** -1.133   -2.780** 
TMdummy 0.233 0.570 0.228 0.568 
logA 2.017    3.982*** 2.035    5.158*** 
BIG 1.611    4.510*** 1.634    4.758*** 
LEV -2.433   -2.427** -2056   -2.251** 
PROF 0.186 0.292 - - 
GROW -1.390 -1.313 - - 
PERF 0.029 0.569 - - 
INTERN -0.072 -0.133 - - 
Adjusted R² 0.359 0.375 
Prob> F 0.000 0.000 
Number of obs. 96 96 
This table presents the results of Model 2 (complete): Ratingit=β0+β1EMdummyit-1+β2TMdummyit-1+β3logAit-1+β4BIGit-
1+β5LEVit-1+β6PROFit-1+β7GROWit-1+β8PERFit-1+β9INTERit-1+εit, and Model 2 (adjusted): Ratingit =β0+β1EMdummyit-
1+β2TMdummyit-1+β3logAit-1+β4BIGit-1+β5LEVit-1 + εit. The adjusted model excluded the variables PROFTit-1, GROW it-1, 
PERFit-1 and INTERit-1. ***,** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Source: Prepared by the authors.   
The results of Model 2 partially confirm H2, since at 5% significance the firms with 
propensity for earnings management to increase profit (EMdummyt-1) were penalized with 
lower ratings, although a propensity for tax management (TMdummyt-1) did not have a 
significant effect on rating.   
Therefore, this result indicates that the analysts of ratings agencies interpret the use of 
earnings management by firms as a risk factor to solvency, and thus assign lower credit ratings. 
However, this same risk is not perceived to be associated with tax aggressiveness. A possible 
explanation for this is Brazil’s tax system. The tax management metric used here is only based 
on taxes on income, while the overall tax burden of firms includes other federal levies plus 
those at the state and municipal levels, all of which vary greatly depending on the firm’s main 
sector of activity (industry, commerce and/or services). 
Among the control variables in Model 2 (adjusted), we stress the statistical significance 
at 1% of BIGit-1 and logAit-1 and at 5% of LEVit-1, and also the confirmation of the sign for 




The aim of this study was to investigate whether the credit ratings on the issuance of 
bonds in the Brazilian market from 2004 to 2014 were influenced by book-tax differences. 
Additionally, we investigated whether there was any influence of earnings and tax management. 
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The results of the regressions indicate that book-tax differences did not determine credit 
ratings in the period studied. This finding runs counter to the literature published since the start 
of this century, in which many articles have reported the relevance of the information contained 
in BTD. More specifically, Ayres et al. (2010) presented evidence that variations in BTDs can 
negatively affect firms’ credit ratings in the American market, although they analyzed the 
influence of variation of BTD instead of the level of this metric. 
Corroborating this result, the robustness tests confirmed the result found in Model 1, 
showing that the RTT did not affect the relevance of this study, and the discretionary differences 
between book and taxable income, represented by TBTD, also did not act as a significant factor 
determining credit ratings. 
However, the results of the regressions indicate firms with propensity to manage 
earnings upward are penalized with lower credit ratings, evidencing analysts interpret this 
behavior as a solvency risk factor of Brazilian firms. Additionally, the results of the robustness 
tests, besides confirming this result, indicate not only are firms that are more aggressive in 
managing earnings penalized, but the simple fact of managing earnings upward also brings this 
penalty. This finding also indicates analysts do not see downward management of earnings as 
a solvency risk factor. 
The robustness tests, not reported in this working paper by limitation of space, also 
indicate firms that more aggressively manage earnings, whether to increase or decrease them, 
are not penalized, thus confirming that analysts interpret the fact that managers tend to increase 
earnings as a solvency risk factor, regardless of the level. 
Finally, the results both of the regressions and robustness tests provide evidence  the 
propensity to manage taxes does not have an effect on credit ratings in the Brazilian market. 
As it is the case of all studies, this one has some limitations, mainly the small sample 
size, with only 96 observations. For future studies we suggest using corporate credit ratings 
over longer periods and with larger samples, as well as the inclusion of other metrics to calculate 
earnings management through discretionary accruals. 
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